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‘SO UNLIKE THE NORMAL LUNATIC’:
ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY IN
BRAM STOKER’S DRACULA

William Hughes
Bath College of Higher Education
The perceived intimacy of the relationship between the lunatic
Renfield and Dracula has ensured that the former has received little
critical attention in his own right. Seward’s passing remark that
Renfield “seems so mixed up with the Count in an indexy kind of way”
has bolstered a critical approach that dismisses the lunatic merely as a
projection of the Vampire’s appetite, or, at most, as his symbolic
herald.1 The currency of such views makes it equally easy to assume
that Renfield’s mental condition has arisen as a consequence of his
encounter with Dracula—an assumption which lifts the character out of
a medical context in order to realign him with the perceived occult and
symbolic scripts of the novel.2
A closer examination of Dracula, however, reveals that Renfield’s
psychosis is already at an advanced stage some months prior to the
Count’s arrival in England. Renfield is first questioned in the asylum
by the alienist, Seward, on May 25. Dracula, as Harker’s Journal and
the Ship’s Log of the Demeter confirm, leaves Transylvania on June 30
and lands in England, at Whitby, on August 7.3 The vampire, as Van
Helsing informs Seward, cannot easily cross running water, and so
must be judged as playing no part in the genesis or early development
of Renfield’s mental disorder.4
Similarly, Renfield’s psychosis is analogous, rather than identical,
to the parasitic practices of Dracula. Seward takes pains to classify his
patient: “My homicidal maniac is of a peculiar kind. I shall have to
invent a new classification for him, and call him a zoophagous (life
eating) maniac....”5
Significantly, Seward repeatedly draws attention to the manner in
which Renfield ‘absorbs’ life. For example, the alienist observes:
He disgusted me much while with him, for when a horrid
blow-fly, bloated with some carrion food, buzzed into
the room, he caught it, held it exultingly for a few
moments between his finger and thumb, and, before I
knew what he was going to do, put it in his mouth and ate
it. I scolded him for it, but he argued quietly that it was
very good and very wholesome; that it was life, strong
life, and gave life to him. 6
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It is clear, then, that Renfield is, as Seward terms him,
zoophagous, or ‘life-eating,’ whereas Dracula is exclusively zoopotous,
or ‘life-drinking.’ Renfield, again, disregards the spiritual value of the
lives he consumes. As he explicitly states: ‘I don’t want any souls!’7
Unlike Dracula, therefore, Renfield does not seek to perpetuate his own
kind, and it is significant that his only venture into blood drinking
occurs after the arrival of the Vampire in the neighbourhood of Seward’s
asylum.8 Dracula, it appears, is able to harness Renfield’s mental
delusion, although there is no evidence as to his having created it. In
short, Renfield’s psychosis remains a medical rather than occult
phenomenon for most of its duration.
It thus becomes possible to approach Renfield by way of Victorian
medical discourse—to treat him in effect as a representation of a
conventional mental patient, despite Seward’s assertion that Renfield is,
in his morbid ideas at least, ‘so unlike the normal lunatic.’9 But
Seward, equally, is subject to the same medical discourse, and to criteria
which should construct him as a version of ‘normal’ sanity, as one
having mental qualities distinguishable from those of his patient. This
discursive intimacy between physician and patient permits in the novel
a realignment of their relative or reciprocal positions, of their
relationship to each other and to the ‘normal.’ In Dracula, it may be
argued, the ‘normal’ is a quantum defined largely through its absence,
signified primarily by the presence of deviations. But the boundary
between symptom and treatment is by no means fixed, and their
relationship may be seen to be at times more parallel than reciprocal.
No explicit information is advanced in the novel regarding Seward’s
customary treatment of the lunatics placed under his care at the private
asylum in Purfleet. Some insight, however, may be gained from a
retrospective remark which the alienist makes in his phonograph
journal immediately following the initial examination of the patient.
Seward recalls:
I questioned him more fully than I had ever done, with a
view to making myself master of the facts of his
hallucination. In my manner of doing it there was, I now
see, something of cruelty. I seemed to wish to keep him
to the point of his madness—a thing which I avoid with
the patients as I would the mouth of hell.10

Seward is suggesting that his customary practice is one in which
the patient’s delusion is persistently marginalised rather than
confronted. The attention of the patient is directed away from the
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psychosis, and thus also from its ‘faulted’ logic—‘the point of his
madness.’ The patient is therefore forced to participate in the ‘sane’
world and its values rather than in those which structure the
‘hallucination’ or delusion.
Seward’s customary clinical approach resembles the
physiologically-based psychology of the British physician, W. B.
Carpenter. Carpenter argued that both physical and mental activity were
‘habituated’ into accustomed processes and motions shaped essentially
on the pattern of the exercise of the conscious mind. Carpenter states,
for example, that
...the Physiological mechanism has this
peculiarity,—that it forms itself according to the mode
in which it is habitually exercised; and thus not only its
automatic but even its unconscious action comes to be
indirectly modified by the controlling power of the
Will.11

The ‘habituation’ of the unconscious ‘physiological mechanism’ of
the brain was further developed by Carpenter into a process termed
‘unconscious cerebration,’ in which logical conclusions on one specific
topic or question could be formulated unconsciously whilst the
conscious portion of the mind was otherwise engaged upon another.12
Unconscious cerebration is mentioned explicitly several times in
Dracula. Seward, for example, considers the process to be integral to his
own inductive activity:
...the rudimentary idea in my mind is growing. It will be
a whole idea soon, and then, oh, unconscious
cerebration! you will have to give the wall to your
conscious brother.1

But Seward also applies the term to his patient when he recalls one
of Renfield’s insane fits. In an initial visit the alienist raises the
question of the souls of the creatures consumed by the lunatic. He
returns to Renfield’s cell:
When I came in he said at once, as though the
question had been waiting on his lips:—
‘What about souls?’ It was evident then that my
surmise had been correct. Unconscious cerebration was
doing its work, even with the lunatic.14
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Despite the coda to Seward’s concluding sentence, this is, in
Carpenter’s model, not an unusual situation. Carpenter asserts:
I feel convinced that, in the habitually well-disciplined
nature, this unconscious operation of the Brain, in
balancing for itself all these considerations, in putting
all in order (so to speak), and in working out the result,
is far more likely to lead us to good and true decision,
than continual discussion and argumentation.15

Conversely, the argument follows that an insane nature will
produce results compatible only with its psychotic state—logical
within the rubric of its own delusion, though seriously out of step with
the world beyond.16 As Seward later phrases it: How well the man
reasoned; lunatics always do within their own scope (Stoker, 1897, 71).
The physiological and psychological mechanism by which these
results are produced is, however, arguably the same in both cases.
Carpenter perceives the alienist’s role in such clinical situations as
fundamentally one of surrogate Will to the irresponsible patient:
For there can be no doubt that while the tendency to
brood upon a particular class of ideas and on the feelings
connected with them, gives them, if this tendency be
habitually yielded to, an increasing dominance,—so that
they at last take full possession of the mind, overmaster
the Will, and consequently direct the conduct,—there is a
stage in which the Will has a great power of preserving
the right balance, by steadily resisting the ‘brooding’
tendency, calling-off the attention from the
contemplation of ideas which ought not to be
entertained, and directing it into some entirely different
channel (Carpenter 671).

The patient is thus ‘habituated back’ into culturally permissible or
vigorous mental practices, which in turn lead to acceptable conclusions
or results. The patient may thus, theoretically, be cured of his delusion,
provided the alienist persists with the treatment.
Seward, of course, does not continue the therapy. As surrogate Will
to his patient, Seward is at best absent or distracted: he is never
disinterested. Utilising the same medical logic that supports his
therapeutic practice, Seward progressively takes steps to facilitate rather
than retard the progress of Renfield’s psychosis. The alienist forces the
lunatic’s attention directly onto the locus of the delusion, initially
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through encouraging the patient to accumulate material closely
associated with its gratification. Seward recalls:
5 June.—He seems to have some settled scheme of
his own, but what it is I do not yet know....Just now his
hobby is catching flies. He has at present such a quantity
that I have had myself to expostulate. To my
astonishment, he did not break out into a fury, as I
expected, but took the matter in simple seriousness. He
thought for a moment and then said: ‘May I have three
days? I shall clear them away.’ Of course, I said that must
do. I must watch him.
18 June.—He has turned now his mind to spiders,
and got several very big fellows in a box. He keeps
feeding them with his flies, and the number of the latter
is becoming sensibly diminished, although he has used
half his food in attracting more flies from outside to his
room (Stoker, 1897, 68, c.f. 116, 270).

Renfield subsequently tames a group of sparrows in order to
dispose of the spiders, again at Seward’s request. The alienist uses this
development as an opportunity to accelerate the delusion through
suggestive and provocative questioning:
When I came in he ran to me and said he wanted to
ask me a great favour—a very, very great favour; and as
he spoke he fawned on me like a dog. I asked him what it
was, and he said, with a sort of rapture in his voice and
bearing:
‘A kitten, a nice little, sleek, playful kitten, that I
can play with, and teach, and feed—and feed—and feed!’ I
was not unprepared for this request, for I had noticed how
his pets went on increasing in size and vivacity, but I did
not care that his pretty family of tame sparrows should
be wiped out in the same manner as the flies and the
spiders, so I said I would see about it, and asked him if he
would not rather have a cat than a kitten. His eagerness
betrayed him as he answered:
‘Oh, yes I would like a cat! I only asked for a kitten
lest you should refuse me a cat. No one would refuse me a
kitten, would they (Stoker, 1897, 70)?’

It is clear that, as an empiricist, Seward is now in more or less
complete possession of the previously unknown ‘settled scheme’ behind
Renfield’s delusion. A final examination of the evidence confirms a
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picture already formulated by the alienist’s own unconscious
cerebration:
11 p.m.—I gave Renfield a strong opiate to-night,
enough to make even him sleep, and took away his
pocket-book to look at it. The thought that has been
buzzing about my brain lately is complete, and the
theory proved....what he desires is to absorb as many
lives as he can, and he has laid himself out to achieve it
in a cumulative way. He gave many flies to one spider,
and many spiders to one bird, and then wanted a cat to eat
the many birds (Stoker, 1897, 70-71. c.f. 69).

The progression in size within Renfield’s food-chain is both logical
and obvious as Seward himself implies, above. It is only the nutritional
logic upon which the consumption is founded that is dissonant to the
‘sane’ world.17
The image of the thought ‘buzzing about’ inside Seward’s brain,
however, signals the edge of an approaching discursive crisis in the
text, a breaking down of the supposed mental, or rather, logical,
differences that distinguish patient from physician.18 The metaphor,
with its insect associations, aligns the clinical conclusions which
Seward draws from his observation of Renfield’s consumption of life
with the nutritional ‘statistics’ which the patient formulates from his
own self-analysis.
Seward has already noted the regularity of Renfield’s introspective
activity:
He has evidently some deep problem in his mind, for he
keeps a little note-book in which he is always jotting
down something. Whole pages are filled up with masses
of figures, generally single numbers added up in batches,
and then the totals added in batches again, as though he
was ‘focusing’ some account, as the auditors put it
(Stoker, 1897, 69).

Physician and patient are observing the same process of ingestion.
Both preserve their conclusions in a private journal—the phonograph or
note-book. Only the assumed status of the physician as sociallyresponsible manipulator of an approved discourse assigns the roles of
sanity and insanity, of observer and observed in the novel. But Seward,
as his manipulation of Renfield’s psychosis continually demonstrates,
becomes increasingly irresponsible as his insane counterpart’s
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obsession develops. Seward’s manipulation of his patient’s displaced
appetite parallels Renfield’s ploys to attract flies, spiders and birds
(Stoker, 1897, 107, 101). Essentially, he is ‘consuming’ Renfield’s
activities as empirical data.
It is in the privacy of Seward’s phonograph journal, which the
reader may study in much the same way as the alienist peruses
Renfield’s notebook, that the medical discourse in the text suddenly
turns back upon itself, directing its gaze away from the customary
subject of the patient and onto the normally transparent presence of the
perceiving physician. Seward moves rapidly from observation to
speculation, and from speculation to introspection:
What would have been his later steps? It would almost be
worth while to complete the experiment. It might be
done if there were only a sufficient cause. Men sneered at
vivisection, and yet look at its results to-day! Why not
advance science in its most difficult and vital aspect—
the knowledge of the brain? Had I even the secret of one
such mind—did I hold the key to the fancy of even one
lunatic—I might advance my own branch of science to a
pitch compared with which Burdon-Sanderson’s
physiology or Ferrier’s brain knowledge would be as
nothing. If only there were a sufficient cause! I must not
think too much of this, or I may be tempted; a good cause
might turn the scale with me, for may not I too be of an
exceptional brain, congenitally (Stoker, 1897, 71)?

Seward’s desire for a ‘cause,’ a justification upon which to base
further intervention in Renfield’s psychopathology, must be read in the
context of the alienist’s earlier assessment of his patient:
...a possibly dangerous man, probably dangerous if
unselfish. In selfish men caution is as secure an armour
for their foes as for themselves. What I think of on this
point is, when self is the fixed point the centripetal force
is balanced with the centrifugal: when duty, a cause, etc.,
is the fixed point, the latter force is paramount, and only
accident or a series of accidents can balance it (Stoker,
1897, 61).

Because the investigation was explicitly initiated out of personal
motives—as an anodyne following the rejection of his courtship by
Lucy Westenra—it is limited, to use Seward’s own theoretical
terminology, by the ‘caution’ of self-restraint, by the self as ‘fixed
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point.’ Even Seward’s ambition, manifested in the text by the coupling
of the names of contemporary physicians with the ‘I’ which is striving
to eclipse their discoveries, is restricted by the absence of ‘a sufficient
cause’ beyond the compass of the self.19
Seward has retreated far from the Hippocratic convention of the
physician as healer. His concern is clearly not for Renfield but for his
‘quaint’ ideas, ‘the case of Renfield,’ his present and future pathology
rather than his return to mental health (Stoker, 1897, 60, 68). Hence
Seward may report:
The man is an undeveloped homicidal maniac. I shall test
him with his present craving and see how it will work
out; then I shall know more (Stoker, 1897, 70).

But Seward fears the consequence of going beyond Renfield’s
‘present craving,’ of playing the mania out to its logical conclusion—‘I
wonder at how many lives he values a man, or if at only one’ (Stoker,
1897, 71). The homicidal motives within the self, sufficient for the
lunatic, are still not enough for his keeper—although Seward is
explicitly wary that excessive concentration on his own obsession
might ‘turn the scale.’ The potential is always there.
The superficial division between ‘sane’ and ‘insane’ is, however,
preserved, despite the novel’s insistence on a common pattern of mental
structures. At the peak of Seward’s obsession ‘duty’—meaning, the
physiological and spiritual needs first of Lucy Westenra and latterly of
Mina Harker—is substituted for the absent ‘cause.’20 Seward is thus
enabled to demonstrate his ‘sanity,’ to return to the Hippocratic
convention of healing, to align with Van Helsing rather than with
Renfield, the latter by now increasingly associated with the ‘criminally
insane’ Count Dracula.21
Reading Dracula by way of Victorian medical discourse thus
permits the relationships between Renfield, Seward and Dracula to take
on a different perspective. The vampire becomes a coda to Renfield’s
mental illness, rather than its central feature. Seward, through his
medical malpractice, assumes the responsibility not merely for
exacerbating Renfield’s illness, but also, ironically, for facilitating the
vampire’s access to Mina Harker, and the death of his patient also.22
Most revealing of all, however, is the implication that any analysis of
Renfield will bring the reader finally to Seward—not merely through
the alienist’s intervention in his patient’s original illness, but rather
through the mental conditions, drives and neuroses which both share.
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When Seward says of Renfield’s obsession, ‘We are progressing,’ he is
pointing also to the parallel neurosis of his own watchfulness, his own
consumption, of which the reader is frequently an observer, but seldom,
it seems, an analyst (Stoker, 1897, 69).
NOTES
1B. Stoker, Dracula [1897] (Oxford, 1983), p. 248. c.f.p.
225. For modern critical views of Renfield see C. Leatherdale,
Dracula: The Novel and the Legend (Wellingborough, 1985), pp.
178-179.
2V. Sage, Horror Fiction in the Prostestant Tradition
(Basingstoke, 1988), p. 54.
3Stoker 1897, pp. 60, 52„ 81, 75. The novel specifies no
year for its action.
4Stoker 1897, p. 240. Renfield is committed to psychiatric
care through the intervention of his friends. See Stoker 1897, pp.
233-234.

5Stoker 1897, pp. 70-71.
6Stoker, p. 69, c.f. pp. 70,115, 232, 234, 255.
7Stoker 1897, p. 270, c.f. pp. 268-269.

8Stoker 1897, p. 141.
9Stoker 1897, p. 60.
10Stoker 1897, p. 60.

11 William B. Carpenter, Principles of Mental Physiology
with their Applications to the Training and Discipline of the Mind
and the Study of its Morbid Conditions (London, 1874), p. 15.

12Carpenter defined the process of Unconscious
Cerebration in 1853. According to Whyte, the term entered
popular usage around 1870. See L.L. Whyte, The Unconscious
Before Freud (London, 1967), pp. 155, 163, 169-170; W. B.
Carpenter, ‘The Unconscious Action of the Brain,’ Science
Lectures for the People, Third Series (1871), pp. 3, 18; c.f. F.P.
Cobbe, ‘Unconscious Cerebration. A Psychological
Study,’Macmillan's Magazine (November 1870), pp. 25-26.

13Stoker 1897, p. 69.

14Stoker 1897, p. 270. For other references to the concept
see Stoker 1897, p. 69, and c.f. p. 278, pp. 340-341. The process
is mentioned occasionally in Stoker’s other fiction. See The
Shoulder of Shasta (Westminsters, 1895), p. 215; Lady Athlyne
(London, 1908), p. 250.
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15Carpenter 1874, pp. 532-533.

F. Cobbe, p. 33. Consider also Van Helsing’s reference
to ‘madman’s logic’: Stoker 1897, p. 194.

17Note the momentarily ‘sane’ Renfield’s assessment of his
delusion during his interview with Mina Harker. Stoker 1897, p.
234.

18Note that Van Helsing uses the same image in connexion
with his own unconscious cerebration: Stoker 1897, p. 340.
19For information on Ferrier and Burdon-Sanderson see: R.
Jann, “Saved by Science? The Mixed Metaphors of Stoker’s
Dracula, ” TSLL 31 (1989), 277 and n. 12.

20Seward, as a gentelmen, also has a conventional ‘duty’
towards women in distress. See Mark Girouard, The Return to
Camelot: Chivalry of the English Gentleman (New Haven, 1981),
p. 260.

21 Note that Van Helsing describes ‘the philosophy of
crime’ as ‘the study of insanity’: Stoker 1897, p. 341.
22Note Van Helsing’s words to Jonathan Harker: Stoker
1897, p. 302.
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